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2.

by the terms of the contract

bet\o~een

the producer and

customer, if fot1nd by the Commission to be just and reasonable,

-

rather than by the fluctuating area rates for new gas now
or hereafter established by the Commission.
certificating the contract sale, the

In addition, in

C~mmission

will simultaneously

authorize the producer to abandon the interstate service at
the conclusion of the contract term.

CADC (Robb) generally

upheld this optional procedure, finding it consistent \dth
the requirements of the Natural Gas Act .

If. held, hcrv1ever,

that the provision allowing the Commission to approve abandonment at the end of the contract tenn is inconnistent with
Section 7(b) of the Act, 15

u.s.c .

§

717f(b) .

The FPC seeks

c ertiorari, asking the Court to reverse this aspect of CADC's
dec is io·r l . *
2.

Facts and Decision Below:

gas are required , under

§

Producers of natural

7 (c) of the Natural Gas Act , to

obtain from the FPC certificates of public convenience and
necessity for sales of natural gas to pipelines or other
c ustomers in interstate markets .

Once having obtained such

* Respondents urge that the abandonment aspect of CADC's
decision cannot be considered in isolation from that Court's ruling~
on other aspects of ·the optional procedure . They have, therefore,
filed a petition, No . 74-1045, challenging those parts of CADC's
decision upholding the optional procedure . That petition, however,
i s made contingent on the Court's granting the FPC's petition .

3.

certificates, the prices at which the producers may sell their
gas are governed by area rates

(i.~.,

those applicable to all

producers in a defined production area) established by the
Commission as "just and reasonable" under § 4 of the Natural
Gas Pet.

The area r ates are, in effect, price ceilimgs:

the

producer may not charge more than the area rate, although he
may contract with specific customers to sell for less.

Moreover,

if the Comn1ission retroactively adjusts the area rate applicable
to specific sales downward, the producer may be
refund the difference to his customers.

require~

to

Finally, once the

-----

producer is certificated to sell interstate, he may not

------

"-...-·

abandon such service unless the Commission finds, under § 7(b)
~------------~--------~------------------

-

. of the Act, that abandonment is consistent with the public
convenience
and necessity .
_______.....

·----

On August..3, 1972, the Commission, after follm-1ing
t he requisite procedure for rulemaking, issued .Order No . 455,
amending its rules to establ'ish an "optional procedure for
certificating new producer sales of natural gas" in interstate
markets.

The Commission found that because of lengthy

appellate review and the

obligations

producers aere reluctant

established

------~-------------------------~-------------

by the Commission.

Hence producers were reluctant to dedicate

~

newly discovered gas reserves to the interstate market, rather
than the unregulated intrastate market, or to incur the heavy

·.

:·

4.
investment

.

n~cessary

new gas supplies.

to the discovery and development of

The optional procedure is, according to

the Commission, designed to alleviate the uncertainty and

1 the

interstate gas shortage to which tt has contributed.
Under the optional procedure, producers may tender

for the Corrmission's approval contracts for the sale of new
~

natural gas

<!·~·,

gas not previously dedicated to the

interstate market) at rates that may exceed the -maximum
authorized by the applicable area rate order.

The Commission

may then determine in a single proceeding whether the public
convenience and necessity, under § 7(c) of the Act, ·warrants
certification of the sale and whether the rates set in the
¢ontract, including definite increments in the rates during
the contract's life, are "just and reasonable" as required
by§ 4(a).

If the certificate is issued and accepted by the

--- --- ----------------

producer, it is not subject to change in later proceedings under
§ 4, and the rates may be collected without risk of refund

--

obligations.

The Commission could, however, at some future ttme,

use its § 5 power to change the contract rates prospectively.
Moreover, when it issues

~he

certificate, the

~

Commission may, at the same time, authorize the producer to
~

abandon the sale at the end of the contract term, if
authorization of such future abandonment is found, under§ 7(b),
to be consistent with the public convenience and necessity.

•.

If

5.
such authorization is given, the producer would be free when
the contract expirea to withdraw the gas from interstate commerce
without h.:tving to demonstrate again that abandorunent is consistent
with the public convenience and necessity.

Pre-granted

abandomnent authority thus would give a producer assurance
that his present sale will not indefinitely commit the gas to
what may be a lower-priced interstate market.
In return for the rate certainty (and, in same cases,
abandonment assurance) made possible by Order No. 455, a
producer who accepts a permanent certificate issued under the
order "'t'laive [ s] all rights to seek future rate increases under
Section 4

**

*, other than price escalations" called for by

the contract and certificated by the Commission.

In ad(ation,

the contract may not contain certain indefinite price escalation
clauses, and the producer who accepts a permanent certificate
waives his right to benefit from any contingent escalations
of the price of flowing gas provided for under the applicable
area rate order .
The Court of Appeals upheld the optional procedure in
----------------------~----------------------------

all respects -save that relating to the power to grant abandonment
-~

~uthority

-

simultaneous!

--

r

with

- -

-

-~----

certification .~~'

first,

that, in issuing the order, the Commission had complied with
the Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking requirements.
Second it held that the optional procedure did not amount to
deregulation of the field ma'r ket in natural gas, since the
contract rates would be judged by the "just and reasonable"

6.

standard of § 4,

th~

Commission's judgment would be subject

to judicial review, and the Commission would remain able,
under § 5, to

lo~>1er

the contract rates prospectively.

Third ,

CADC ruled that advance approval of definite escalations
in rates established in the contracts would not violate
§

4(e) of the Act, which requires that increases in rates be

preceded by 30 days notice to the Commission and the public.
The Court stated that, before any fixed contract escalation
went into effect, the producer would have to provide the
notice that
use its

§

§

4 (e) requires .

Moreover, the Commission. could

5 power to disapprove the escalation.

'I'he Court

agreed with chailengers to .the order that it might be difficul t
for the Commission to judge, long in advance of their

effe ctiY~

date, that a contract's fixed escalations in rates would b3
just and reasonable .

But, the Court stated, this problem

was a matter of proof , and such a judgment might be possible
in some cases even though it would not be in others .

The

Court concluded, therefore, that the procedure was not, as
an abstract matter, necessarily inconsistent with § 4 in all
conceivable applications.
Fourth, CADC held that the order's exemption of producers
certificated under it from any refund obligations did not
violate § 4(e) , since that section provides only that the
Commission may order refunds, not that it must do so in all
cases.

Fifth, the Court held that

cAne

was not imperntisaibl)

discriminating among producers in re'q uiring that those

7.
certificated under the

option~l

procedure waive all rights to

the contingent escalations in. new gas rates provided in aren
rate orders.

The dontingent escalations, designed to stimulllt c

the volume of interstate dedications, were integral parts of
the area rate system of incentives, and had no application
to producers choosing the inducements of the optinal procedure .

\·:)

Sixth, the Court ruled that the Commission's refusal to approve
indefinite rate escalations in contracts

(~·&·,rate

increase g

in area rates) was not arbitrary, since the whole purpose of
the new program '"as to provide certainty by means of exemption.
.•

tak~

from the :: area rates, and not to give producers a chance to

~' j ,

advantage of increases in the area rates while irnmunb;ing

thi.~r,l

from decreases.

-

Finally, the court . -~urned to that aspect of the optional
procedure allowing the Commission, in granting certification,

-------------------

simultaneously to approve abandonment of the sale at the
---·-

-----.---..__.~---------.
';•.'

conclusion of the contract term.
abandonment inconsistent with
provides:

-· -- -

·-- -

-

-

The court held such pregrants

§ 7(b)

of the Act .

-----

That section

·- - - · · " - -

N~JllL£...Qrr!~ shall abandon all or
any portion of its facilitles-9ubjact to the juriadiction of the Commission, or an_y sc!rvice rende red
by means of such facilities, witfiout the-permission
and approval of the Commission~irst had and ootuined,
affi~~nrinding by the Commission
that the available supply of natural gas is depleted
to the extent that the continuance of service is
unl'larrnnted, or that the presm.l t or future public
convenience or necessity permit such abandonment •

.'J· '

.' .
.

"
.....

--------~------------------------------------------~9.

3.

CONTENTIONS:

The SG argues that CADC's decision on

pregranted abbndonment conflicts with CAlO's decision in
Sunray Oil Co. v. ffQ, 239 F. 2d 97, reversed on other grounds
353 U.S. 944 (hereinafter, Sunray I) and also this Court ' s
decision in Sunray II, 364

u.s.

137, cited by CADC.

Sunray I, the Connnission had refused to issue a
limited in duration, contending that
issue only unlimited certificates.

§

In

7 certificflt(>

§

7(b) required it to

CAlO disagreed, holding

') that the Commission did have pm>1er to limit certificates to
. fb·:ed periods.

Subsequently, in Sunray .,.:.II,- CAlO held that w1Lil.

the Commission has authority to issue limited term ccrtificet('f:S)
it also has authority to issue a certificate unlimited in

tim~,

even though the producer has applied for only a limited term
certificate.

This Court affirmed .

But in so doing, it did

as CADC erroneously thought, disapprove limited term
On

the contrary, the Court stated that there

~.:ras

no t~

cert:i.fic,::~t

"no contention

that the Commission was again indulging in the erroneous
notion that it had no power to issue a limited certificate."
Thus the Court, in Sunray II, held only that the Commission
had power to require permanent certificates, -n ot that limited
t erm certificates are precluded .
The ' SG contends that CADC ' s disapproval of pregranted
abandonment is not required by § 7 (b).
section requires that the Commission's

Nothing in that
(/..£;J
judgment~ to

the effects

of the abandonment cannot be made in advance of the time the
abandonment is to occur .

Moreover , in making its § 7(b)

10.
judgment, the Commission can properly take into account the
public need for gas prior to the proposed termination date,
and whether a promise that the producer will be allowed to
abandon will help in meeting that need.
Finally the SG argues that CADC's disapproval of
pregranted abandonment will seriously impair the viability
of the optional procedure and, hence, the Commission's ability
to deal with the interstate gas shortage.

The SG says that,
~--

since CADC is clearly wrong, this is an appropriate candidate
for summary reversal.
· In their responses, the challengers to the optional
procedure generally rely on CADC's decision on this point.
They also argue that the pregranted abandonment problem
cannot be considered in isolation from other aspects of the
optional procedure.

Therefore, if the Court grants this

petition, it should also grant the challengers' contingent
cross-petition.
4.

Discussion:

for summary reversal.

This does not seem a proper candidate
It 'is true that, in Sunray II, this Court

appears to have assumed that limited term certificates and
pregranted abandonments are equivalent, and to have said,
in dictum, that the Commission has power, despite§ 7(b},
to grant such certificates.

But, despite this

~

ass1~tion,

is at least a theoretical difference between pregranted
abandonment, contemplated by the FPC here, and the kind of

.,•.

•. .:
,.

.'

'

...

there

11.

limited term certification held within the FPC's power by

CA 10 in Sunray
Sunray II.

~

and apparently approved by the Court in

Ltmited term certification means that the

producer will be required, at the conclusion of the term,
to demonstrate that the public convenience and necessity
requires his continued participation in the interstate market.
But it does not necessarily mean that such a producer can, at
the end of

th~

term, unilaterally cease selling interstate,

without the Commission's permission under§

7(b}~

In other

words, a producer with a limited term certificate could be
required to demonstrate that the public interest either does
or does not require continued interstate sales, and the
Commission might be able to order him to continue selling
interstate if it finds that the public convenience and
necessity so requires.

Pregranted abandonment, however, means

that the Commission has already decided that. at the end of
the contract term the producers continued sales interstate
will be unnecessary to the public interest .
In fact, the court in Sunray II seems to have left

"-

open the question whether pregranted abandonment would be
consistent with§ 7(b)'s requirement:
---------~~¥n~a~ly

it is suggested that for various
J:"easona ~1hich petitioner claims to be related to
the public interest, it would be more advantageous
if gas producers were given a free hand, after
the completion of each cont:~;act, to determine for
themselves \-Jhethcr they shollld continue to serve
the interstate market. These considerations were
not urged before the Cmumission, and hence we are

.

'

12.

not called upon to decide whether they would
compel a different approach by the Conunission
to the queotion of ttme limitations in
certificates, or even whether, in the light of
the Act's provisions - particularly the policy
expressed in § 7(b) - it would be proper for
it so to rely on them."
364

u.s.

at 158.

Moreover, the Sunrax II opinion, as CADC

noted, described at length the reasons why pregranted
abandonment may be contrary to the public interest.
It is not clear, however, that § 7(b) compels CADC's
result.

The possibility of pregranted abandonment is

almost certainly a significant incentive to producers to use
the Commission's optional procedure and, as the SG argues,
"----'

its diGapproval by CADC seems likely to reduce the procedure'o
effectiveness.

Finally, CADC dealt in this case with a rule,

which stated only that the Commission would, in appropriate
cases, grant abandonment simultaneously with certification.
CADC's holding on this point thus meant that

in~

case,

however short the contract term, could pregranted abandonment
be consistent with the Commission's obligations under§ 7(b).
This holding that § 7(b) absolutely precludes pregranted
abandonment, whatever the facts of a particular case, seems
highly questionable.
I recommend that the petition be granted.
There is a response.
Carr

February 26, 1975

.. ..

~

,_

..
(

..

··-

CADC opn in petn app

G-

March 14, 1975 Conference
List 3, Sheet 5
Motion for Leave to File An
Amicus Brief Urging Grant

No. 74-883
FEDERAL POWER COMM 1 N

MOSS
The petn of the FPC is listed at page 3 of this Conference list.

The Inter state

Natural Gas Assoc. of America seeks leave to file an amicus brief supporting the
FPC 1 s petn for cert.

INGAA' s motion was filed February 20.

INGAA 1 s members include most of the natural gas transmission companies
subject to the jurisdiction of the FPC.

The association is concerned that the decision

below if affirmed could eliminate a significant source of natural gas for the interstate
market which the pipeline companies urgently need in order to minimize curtailments
in service to their customers.

INGAA argues that the decision below, insofar as it

declared unlawful the pre-granted abandorunent provision of Commission Order No.

'•

is in conflict with precedent of this Court and with decisions of CA 10 1 Sunray MiaContinental Oil Co. v. FPC 1 364 U.S. 137; Sun Oil Co~ v. FPC, 364 U.S. 170 1 which
'

held that the FPC has the power under the Natural Gas Act to grant limited-term
certificates of public convenience and necessity.
DISCUSSION:

Rule 42(1) provides in pertinent part:

A brief of an amicus curiae prior to consideration• • •
of the petition for writ of certiorari1 filed with • • • a
motion for leave to file when consent is refused 1 may
be filed only if submitted a reasonable time prior to
the consideration of• • • the petition. • • Such motions
are not favored.
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PRELIMINARY MEMO

May 9, 1975, Confer Pnce
List 3, Sheet I
No. 74-1045
MOSS, ET AL.

Cert to CA DC
(Tamm, MacKinnon, Robb)

v.
FEDERAL

1.

POWEJ.~

COMMISSION

SUM1v1 A~s_~_:

Federal/ Civil

Time Question':'

The FPC adopted a new certificating procedure which allowed

'\._../ ,;. 1CA DC c nte red J udgmc nt on August 15, 1974, and denied petitions for rehearing on Sept em
-

ber 19, 1974. The Chief Justice granted the FPC an extension until January 17, 1975, and
the f)(j filect on th at d ate . Petrs herein, resps in No. 74-883, did not request an extension
but filed this conditional eros s -petition on February 20, 1975- -apparently jurisdictionally
out of time.

Petrs contend th a t the n ee d for this petition did not arise until the SG had sought cert in
No. 74-883. Wh e n that occurred, petrs argue, they recognized that the issue raised by th
SG 1 s petition could not ''tneaningfully be considered in isolation from the other issues deci c
ed contempor aneously by 11 CADC. This petition was filed 33 days after the SG's.

In at least 1 wu cas es th e Court has taken untimely conditional eros s -petitions. Brotherho a
of_ R_a i]~~Cl erks v. Florida East Coa s t Railway Co., 382 U.S. 1008, 384 U.S. 239, 243;
Pi e rsc'l2 v. Ray, 384 U.S. 938, 386 U.S. 547, 551. According. to Stern & Gressman the
ration a l e i s th ;<t th e Court's jurisdiction over the whole case attaches when the first petitinn is timely fiJ e d, thus any other party may file an additional petition involving the same
j\l <:gm<"nt. Stern & Grc s sman, at 311-12. The rationale makes some sense; however, the
wo1.·din g of 28 USC 210 l (c) does not se elll to support such an exception, and petrs present
no excusC' for lH't timely filing this conditional petition as a precaution. If the Court grant:
this eros s- p ciiLinn , it sh ould address th v i.s s ue squarely and establish guidelines for this
situation.
7

- ·. :,
.'

natural gas producers to avoid some of the drawbacks of the

11

area rate 11 method.

CA DC

approved all but one part of the procedure and the SG, sought cert in No. 74-883 requ estin g
a summary reversal on that one issue.

The challengers to the new procedure, petrs h e rein

and resps in No. 74-883, argue in this conditional cross-petition that the entire procedure
must be reviewed if the SG 1 s petition is granted.
I

2.

FACTS:

A complete explanation of the new procedure, and the CA DC decision,

is presented in the preliminary memo for No. 74-883.

Basically, the new procedure allo'A'E

producers to avoid certain drawbacks presented by FPC area rates --geographical price
ceilings--and thereby encourages producers to dedicate newly available natural gas to the
interstate market as opposed to unregulated intrastate markets.

Under the new procedure

producers subm.it individual long-term contracts to the FPC for approval; the contracts
provide for the sale of

11

new 11 gas at prices which may exceed the area rate, and although

the FPC could use its §5 power to change the contract rates prospectively, once a certificate is granted

a producer need not fear a refund order if the area rates decrease.

In

return for rate certainty, including definite increments during the life of the contract, the
producer waives the §4 right to seek future rate increases and to benefit from any contingent escalations of the area rate.
CA DC found this much of the procedure conformed with the Natural Gas Act, 15
USC 717; however, the court held that at the time it is sues the certificate the FPC may not
grant producers the right to abandon the sale at the end of the c;:ontract term.

Section 7(b)

of the Act, 15 USC 717£(b), requires a hearing and a finding of public convenience and
necessity before the FPC allows abandonment of any service, and CA DC concluded that
"pre granted abandonment requires more clairvoyance than even the Commission's expe rtise reasonably encompasses.

11

_ ./

3.

CONTENTIONS:

In No. 74-833 the SG seeks to salvage pregranted abandonmen

and argues there was plain error on that issue. He suggests the Court reverse sum.marily

·..

. ..

~----~------------------~---~,--~----------------~-----------

t•

because the viability of the new procedure will be

s~riously

impaired by the CA DC rulin g .

Petrs conditionally seek to bring the rest of the judgment into questi o n.

They

single out the provision under the new procedure that in s ures a producer that. o nc e a
certifica~e

is issued

no refunds will be required if the area rate drops.

this provision violates the statutory purpose of assuring

11

Petrs c1ai.m

consumers a complete, pern u -

nent and effective bond of protection from excessive rates and charges." Atlantic Ref1ni n g
Co. v . Public Service Com0ission, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959).
Petrs claim the

11

more important question 11 raised here 1s whether the Court r.f

Appeals can continue to allow novel procedures which give producers higher than just ;-.. ndreasonable prices . during the pendency of review proceedings.

Petrs claim that FPC :c1.n d

CA approval of escape hatches like this new procedure undercuts the area rate ancl s • ,

<~ 

how forces it continually upward.

4 / DISCUSSION: Whatever loosening of the jurisdictional requirements tlL ·

J. y

allowed for an untimely conditional cross petition should be contingent upon prese1
of a strong argument for considering the untimely issues.

presented here.

\ ' 11

Obviously, no such argu1 ·."1t is

Petrs fail to state why the pregranted abandonment issue is not eli ---

from the rest of the new certification procedure.

The pregranted abandonment

r de

ma ~ c ••.r

seems me rely to be a question of comparing that practice with §7 and the Court ' s l-' ,
cases on abandonment.

be

E. ·g., Sunray Oil v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137.

. n us

Moreover, a c .; n L!j l<

review at this time of the new certification procedure may be premature, and ma 1
the FPC's attempts to define new ways to deal with energy problems.
There is no response.
Kelly

4/29/75
mee

. .:

1.

l:•'

,,,_ rict

Summer List 9
Sheet 3
Mo1 ~ "> n to Dispense with
Printing An Appendix

No. 74-883
FEDERAL POWER
COMMISSION

v.
MOSS
The SG moves pursuant to Rule 36(8) for leave to dispense with the
requirement of a separate appendix as otherwise required by Rule 36.

He
t

states that the parties have agreed that the only items in the record that need
be separately printed are those that are already reproduced in the appendix to
t he cert petition.

He also advises that the parties may in addition refer in their

briefs to any other items that are part of the originaJ record.
DISCUSSION:

This appears to be a routine motion to dispense with

\.......\

printing an appendix.

The appendix at the back of the cert petition contains

the CA opinion., judgment ann order denying a reh e aring 1 the pertinent

FI~ C

'

'

.

'~

• •l

··~

..

orders and the statutory authority.

The parties reservation of the option to

refer to ''any other items that are part of the original record" does not
(\......;,

necessarily conflict with the Rule 36(1) requirement that the appendix contain
11 (4)

any other parts of the record to which the parties wish to direct the court 1 s

particular attention.
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No. 74-883
Federal Power Commission,) On Writ of Certiorari to
Petitioner,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the DisJohn E. Moss et al.
trict of Columbia Circuit.
[February -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opm10n of the
Court.
Section 7 (b) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 717f
(b), provides that "[n] o natural-gas company shall
abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the
jurisdiction of the [Federal Power] Commission, or any
service rendered by means of such facilities, without the
permission and approval of the Commission first had and
obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission . .. that the present or future public convenience
or necessity permit such abandonment." 1 The question
presented in this case is whether FPC may, upon a
proper finding of public convenience or necessity, simultaneously authorize both the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce by a producer and the abandonment of
"Section 7 (b) of the Act provides in full text:
" No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its
facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any
service rendered by means of such facilities, without the permission
and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due
hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available supply
of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continuance of
service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment."

/
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the sale at a future date certain. The Court of Appeala
for the District of Columbia Circuit construed § 7 (b) to
empower FPC to authorize abandonment only when
and if proposed at the end of the contract term, thus
precluding power to authorize abandonment simultaneously with certificating new producer sales. Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals set aside the FPC order involved
in this case insofar as it permits the Commission, at the
time it issues a certificate of public convenience and
necessity, to authorize the producer to terminate the
sale at the end of the contract term. 502 F. 2d 461
(1974). We granted certiorari. 422 U. S. 1066 (1975).
We reverse.
I
FPC Order No. 455, 48 F. P. C. 218, issued August 3,
1972, is the order involved. The Order was promulgated
under FPC rulemaking authority pursuant to a notice of
April 6, 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 7345, as an addition to FPC's
general rules of practice and procedure, 18 CFR § 2.75
(1975). Order No. 455 established an "optional procedure for certificating new producer sales of natural gas."
48 F . P. C., at 218. The new procedure did not displace
area pricing, but instead provided an alternative to "stimulate and accelerate domestic exploration and development of natural gas reserves." I d. , at 225. The procedure was necessary, the Commission found, because
natural gas producers were frequently unable, due to
hazards of area price revisions in lengthy appellate review
proceedings, to rely upon rates established by FPC in its
area rate orders, and thus were discouraged from exploring for new gas and committing it to the interstate market. For "there is no assurance at the present time that.
a producer may not ultimately have to refund some of an
initial rate .. . upon which the producer relied when it.
dedicated a new gas supply to the interstate market."'

·'
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I d., at 222-223. "[T]he producer does not know ... how
much it will get if it develops and sells new gas to the
interstate market. The producer knows for sure only
that once it sells in interstate commerce it cannot stop
deliveries." /d., at 223. "This uncertainty," the Commission found, "has impeded exploration and development." Ibid.
The optional procedure introduced by Order No. 455
was designed to "lessen rate uncertainty which has prevailed since the early 1960's." /d., at 219. The procedure has several features. First, it permits producers
to tender for FPC approval contracts for the sale of new
natural gas 2 at rates that may exceed the maximum
authorized by the applicable rate order. 8 Second, FPC
will determine in a single proceeding whether the "public
convenience and necessity" under § 7 (c) of the Act, 15
U. S. C. § 717f (c), warrants the issuance of a certificate
authorizing the sale and whether the rates called for by
the contract are "just and reasonable" under § 4 (a), 15
U. S. C. § 717c (a). Third, a permanent certificate issued by the Commission and accepted by the producer
is not subject to change in later proceedings under § 4 of
the Act/ 15 U. S. C. § 717c, and the rates may be col2
The optional procedure is available for sales of gas produced
from wells commenced after April 6, 1972, and gas that has not
previously been sold in interstate commerce. 18 CFR § 2.75 (b) (5)
(1975) .
3 After adoption of the optional procedure, FPC established
a national ceiling rate for some sales of natural gas. Order No. 699,
- F . P. C. (1974) . The optional procedure was then amended
to permit producers to tender contracts for certification including
rates exceeding the national ceiling, as well as area rates. Order
No. 455-B,- F . P. C. (1974) .
4
The procedure does not, however, limit the applicability of § 5,
15 U.S. C. § 717d. See 18 CFR § 2.75 (d) (1975). The Commission
noted in Order No. 455 that it was unable to "bind a future Com~
mission not to invoke the prospective operation of Section 5"; the

74-883-0PINION
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lected without risk of refund obligations. !d., at 226.
See 18 CFR § 2.75 (d) (1975). Fourth, Order No. 455
authorizes inclusion in the permanent certificate of the
abandonment assurance-or "pregranted abandonment"called in question in this case. 18 CFR § 2.75 (e)
(1975).~ The authority to include assurance that the
producer may abandon the sale at the end of the contract term is, however, to be exercised only upon appropriate findings by FPC of public convenience or necessity,
as required by§ 7 (b). Order No. 455-A, 48 F. P. C. 477,
481 (1972) .
The importance to the producer of the pregranted
abandonment provision is obvious. Pregranted abandonment gives the producer assurance that his present sale
will not indefinitely commit the gas to what may be a
lower-priced interstate market: he will be free on
the contract expiration date to discontinue deliveries
to the purchaser without having to demonstrate again
that abandonment is consistent with the public convenience or necessity.
II
The entire optional procedure of Order No. 455 was
attacked in petitions for review before the Court of
Appeals, which upheld the Order in all respects save the
pregranted abandonment authority. 6 In holding that
Commissioners further stated that "[t]o the extent that this Commission can grant certainty of rates, we do so." 48 F. P. C., at 223.
s This provision reads as follows :
"Applications presented hereunder will be considered for permanent certification, either with or without pregranted abandonment,
notwithstanding that the contract rate may be in excess of an area·
ceiling rate established in a prior opinion or order of this
Commission."
6 Respondents' cross-petition seeking review of the Court of
Appeals' decision to the extent that it adversely resolved their
'COntentions was denied. 422 U. S. 1020 (1975).
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~ 7 (b) requires a public C<?nV~~ience Of necessity find:
ing by FPC !1-t the ti~e of the proposed abando~:

!llent, thus pr.eclufling such !Jn~Fng at ~he ti~~ <?f ce~tifi:
p~tiop~ the Collfti o(Appeals stated, 5Q2 F . 2d, at '!72;
"P~egpanteP. !'1-b!'l-n~onment

would leave a producer
pi§cgntinue service to the interstate market,
pefh~tps year.s after the original certification, with no
rontemporaneous obligation on the producer to justify withdraw~! of service as consistent with the pub..
lie convenienc~ ~tnd necessity. We think Section
7 (b) does not contempl~tte or authorize such
procedure.
" . . . It appears to us . . . that pregranted abandon•
ment requires more clairvoyance than even the Com•
mission's expertise reasonably encompasses."
fr~e ~q

We find nothing on the face of § 7 (b) to support the
holding that the section "does not contemplate or author..
ize such procedure." There is no express provision
prescribing the timing of the finding of public convenience or necessity that is prerequisite to FPC authority to
allow the producer to abandon a sale. In the absence
of an explicit direction, the inference may reasonably be
made that Congress left the timing of the finding within
the general discretionary power granted FPC "to regulate
abandonment of service," S. Rep. No. 1162, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess., 2 (1937); H . R. Rep. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess., 2 ( 1937) . "[T] he Commission's broad responsibilities . . . demand a generous construction of its statutory authority," Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390
U. S. 747, 776 (1968) , and that inference is plainly consistent with Congress' regulatory goals.
The reasoning of the Court of Appeals that pregranted
abandonment requires "clairvoyance" overlooks the express power granted to FPC in § 7 (b) to allow abandon-
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ment upon a proper finding that the "present or future''
public convenience or necessity warrants permission to
abandon. The power to authorize an abandonment upon
finding that it is justified by future public convenience or'
necessity clearly encompasses advance authorization
warranted by consideration of future circumstances and
the necessary estimation of tomorrow's needs. That has
been our conclusion when FPC authority to make forecasts of future events has been challenged in other contexts. For example, in rejecting the contention that the
FPC could not consider forecasts of the future under the
nearly identical standard of § 7 (e) , FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Corp., 365 U. S. 1, 28-29 ( 1961), stated
that "a forecast of the direction in which the future
public interest lies necessarily involves deductions based
on the expert knowledge of the agency." Similarly, as
to another agency, we have stated our unwillingness to
let "uncertainties as to the future ... paralyze the [Interstate Commerce] Commission into inaction." United
States v. Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Co., 326 U. S.
236, 241 (1945) . Thus, to the extent that exercising
the pregranted abandonment authority entails forecasting future developments affecting supply and demand,
we cannot say that requiring this degree of "clairvoyance" renders the provision beyond FPC authority.
Furthermore, FPC may determine that present supply
and demand conditions require that pregranted abandonment be authorized in appropriate cases to encourage
exploration for new gas and its dedication to the interstate market, since the unwillingness of producers to
make indefinite commitments has made potentially available supplies inaccessible to the interstate market. We
conclude therefore that an optional procedure encompassing pregranted authority intended to draw new gas
.supplies to the interstate market is clearly within FPC.
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suthority to permit abandonments Justified by either
yrese:nf or [ut11.re public convenience or necessity.7
Order No. 455 does not authorize specific abandonments. It merely establishes an optional procedure under· which pregranted abandonment may be authorized
in appropriate cases. Any pregranted abandonments
approved under this procedure are subject to judicial
review under the Act. See § 19 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 717r
(b). We should not presume, as the Court of Appeals
did, that the Commission is not competent to make
proper findings supported by substantial evidence and
consistent with § 7 (b) in approving pregranted abandonment. Rather, the question whether particular pregranted abandonment authorizations are beyond the
Commission's expertise should await resolution in concrete cases. See FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U. S. 380, 392
(1974). 8 It suffices for the purposes of this case that
" FPC has disclaimed any reliance on the ground, permitted under
§ 7 (b), that "the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the
extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted." We therefore have no occasion to address the question whether pregranted
abandonment on that ground would exceed FPC authority.
8 Paradoxically, similar considerations led the Court of Appeals
to reject respondents' challenge to a provision of the optional
procedure requiring the Commission to determine the reasonableness of futtll'e rate escalations included in contracts submitted pursuant to the procedure. Yet no attempt was made to distinguish
the case of future rate escalations from that of pregranted abandonment in this respect. The Court said :
" We cannot say as an abstract proposition of law that it is impossible for the Commission to make an advance determination of
'reasonableness' in proceedings under Section 4. Although as a
practical matter one may be skeptical about the ability of the Commission to succeed in this endeavor, we think it may make the
attempt. Whether it succeeds will depend upon the evidentiary
basis for the escalations proposed in a given contract and the reasonabfeness of Commission findings and projections supporting and.
al?prov~ su(lh esCJWations. The q~estion is one of proof which Ca.Ill

,"
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we read § 7 (b) as leaving the timing of approval oi
abandonments to FPC discretion. 9

III
The Court of Appeals stated that its construction oi
§ 7 (b) as denying FPC authority to authorize abandon-

ment on a future date certain at the time of certification
was "fortified" by Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC
(Sunray II), 364 U.S. 137 (1960). Sunray II held that
FPC had authority to tender a certificate of public convenience and necessity without time limitation to a
producer who applied for a certificate authorizing sales
for 20 years only. The Co.trt reasoned, id., at 142:
"If petitioners' contentions as to the want of authority in the Commission to grant a permanent
certificate where one of limited duration has been
sought for, were to be sustained, the way would be
clear for every independent producer of natural gas
to seek certification only for the limited period of
its initial contract with the transmission company,
and thus automatically be free at a future date,
untrammelled by Commission regulation, to reassess
whether it desired to continue serving the interstate
market."
We understand the Court of Appeals to read this
passage as implying that a limited-term certificate would
be barred by the Act, and that a permanent certificate
with pregranted abandonment would also be barred since
be answered only on a record setting out a particular proposal and
the evidence supporting it." 502 F. 2d, at 468.
9
Respondents claim that the pregranted abandonment provision
.amounts to deregulation akin to that condemned in FPC v. Texaco,
Inc., supra, at 400. But, unlike the small-producer exemption involved there, the FPC in the optional procedure retains full control
-over its regulatory jurisdiction.

·'
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such a certificate, as FPC concedes, FPC Brief, at 22, is
legally and functionally indistinguishable from a limitedterm certificate. 10 But the Court of Appeals' reading of
Sunray II was patently erroneous. Sunray II in fact
indicated that FPC is authorized to issue limited-term
certificates. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
had addressed that question at an earlier stage of the
litigation and had held that FPC was authorized to issue
such certificates. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC,
.-239 F. 2d 97 (1956), rev'd on other grounds, 353 U. S.
944 (1957) (Sunray /). 11 Sunray II implicitly approved
this holding in stating, 364 U. S., at 157: "There is -no
contention that the 'Commission was again indulging in
the erroneous notion that it had no power to issu.e ~a
limited certificate."
·Thus, rather than imply that the Act forbids the issuance of a limited-term certificate, Sunray 11 approved
the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 'Circuit that the Act permits the issuance of such a certificate.12 Sunray II therefore supports the conclusion we
The Court of Appeals found that pregranted abandonment has
"the same potentiality of prejudice to consumers" that tills Court
was concerned about in Sunray II. 502 F . ' 2d, at 472. In that
case, however, Sunray's position would have removed FPC discr.etion not to issue limited-term certificates . wherever a produ~r
sought a limited certificate. Both Sunray 1! and today's · decisiqn
maintain FPC discretion in this regard, while the Court of Appeals' conclusion reduces FPC's ability to exercise its regulato_ry
responsibility.
·
11 The first decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was reversed in Sunray I on the ground that the Court had
itself decided whether FPC should have issued a limited-term certificate, rather than remanding to the Commission to resolve tills question in the first instance, 353 U. S. 944. ·Sunray II sustained the
Court of Appeals' later affirmance of FPC's issuance of an unlimi~ed
.certificate, 267 F. 2d 471 (1959).
12
•
Moreover. if issuance of limited-term certificates were bari:e<J
10
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have reached and does not fortify the Court of Appeals'
construction of § 7 (b), In both the case of the limitedterm certificate and the case of the permanent certificate
with pregranted abandonment, FPC determines at the
time of certification that the present or future public
convenience or necessity justifies the issuance of a certificate that allows discontinuance of service at a future
date certain without need for further proceedings.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed
insofar as it set aside the pregranted abandonment pro~
vision of Order No. 455, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
MR. JusTICE STEWART, MR. JusTICE PowELL, and MR.
JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

by the Act, there would have been no need to decide Sunray II.
In that circumstance the producer could hardly have complained
that FPC failed to recognize its request for only a limited certificate, since such a reading of the Act requires FPC in all cases to.
issue unlimited-term certificates.
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